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Antonio Dall’Igna 
 
These notes deal with the presence of the theme of grace in the mysticism of 
Cusanus and Bruno. 
The theme of grace is closely related to the complex relation which, in a system 
of theory of knowledge which provides for a ‘mystical’ stage (or a stage of 
knowledge of the divine, of achievement of a maximum and culminating target in 
the hunting-path of truth), is established between universality and singularity, or to 
be more precise, since this speech is about the utmost stage of intensity of truth, 
between the Singular and the singular, because “the Singularity of all singular things 
is singular per se, than which there cannot be anything more singular” (Ven., 
1319).1 Under the Singular is to be meant the divine Cause, the absolute concept or 
the springing monad: personal in the case of Cusanus, impersonal in the case of 
Bruno – but with rich and clean nuances to complicate the status of the Origin. 
Mainly I will not dwell upon the question of the preservation of the intellectual 
singularity in the moment of the veritatis apprehensio, a very important question2 
which raises many issues concerning the relations between Neoplatonism and 
Christianity, and, more generally, the distance which separates a metaphysical 
structure ruled by an impersonal Cause and an ontological consitution governed by 
a personal divinity. Nevertheless the introduction of the theme of grace in the 
discussion allows to analyse the ‘remains’ of human intellectual singularity ex parte 
Dei, i.e. starting from the divine freedom: are we in front of a God (Singular, 
Person) who freely give to man (singular, person) or in front of a different 
mechanism? 
 
With grace is above all meant the gratia gratum faciens (or the second grace), that is 
to say the grace which intervenes at the end of the mystical course as a free act of 
God, the grace which brings into accomplishment the inner deed of the man who 
elevates himself to God. I will keep in the background the gratia creationis (the first 
                                                          
1 “Ita singularitas omnium singularium est per se singularis, quo singularius esse nequit” (Ven. 
XXII, 63). Cf. also Ven. XXII, 63-64. The works of Cusanus are quoted from: Nicolai de Cusa, 
Opera omnia, iussu et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Heidelbergensis ad codicum fidem edita. 
The english translation is quoted from: Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Nicholas of Cusa, 
translated by Jasper Hopkins, 2 vols., Minneapolis/Minnesota: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 2001, 
except where indicated. “The coincidence of singularity and universality in God, as absolute 
singularity of all the singular, is reaffirmed in the Apologia doctae ignorantiae, with an implicit 
reference to the eckhartian theme of the indistincta distinctio” (Mancini: “Quando recte consideratur, 
omnia sunt clara. Singolarità e finalità nel De docta ignorantia di Nicola Cusano”, p. 89 n. 22, transl. in 
English by me). 
2 Cf., for example, Cuozzo: Mystice videre. Esperienza religiosa e pensiero speculativo in Cusano, p. 135. Cf. 
also Mignini: “La dottrina dell’individuo in Cusano e in Bruno”, pp. 325-349. 
grace), which is given by God to all natural beings. And I will dwell upon the 
costant assistance that God provides to man during his mystical course, upon 
God’s continuous support which accompanies the traveller during his metaphysical 
return, exactly because it can be understood as an ‘extension’ of the second grace. 
It is necessary to specify that the constant presence of God ‘before’, ‘during’ and 
‘after’ (I’m using temporal terms, aware that the temporal sequence is not 
appropriate for expressing the mystical mechanism) the process, that man brings to 
effect in himself and which leads to the deification, is to be thought as a staying of 
man in God, or, ‘dynamising’ the concept of God, as a staying of man in the grace 
of God. This human position, which provides for the position of the caused being 
in its cause, corresponds, in the mystical sphere, to the presentia of God in man. 
Here grace is conceived as a ‘place’ where man has always lived, as a place with 
which man is deeply sodden, however without resulting in a superposition and a 
fitting together of the place’s absolute contours and of its inhabitants’ limited 
profile or in a complete solution of the man’s constitutive finiteness in the infinite 
divine plenitude. Man can penetrate further into this original place honouring his 
own ontological limits: he can confirm his own ‘entity’ by answering to the 
presence-summons of God; he can centre himself without overflowing; he can 
reduplicate himself without encumbering. If the apex of man is always an imago Dei, 
the task that God commits to man – by letting man stay into freedom, but not 
depriving him of continuous attendance, i.e. by projecting constantly his light over 
man’s freedom, by placing the limited human freedom in the infinite divine 
freedom – is the confirmation of the image,3 the dynamic saturation of the space of 
the human-divine identity, but certainly not an overcoming of the limits which 
constitute man as an image of God. In the God-man relation there is no 
undermining of the bond or dissolution of the relation, nor a breaking off and a 
caesura, a disfiguring or a transfiguration of the human features: on the contrary, 
more restrictedly, an illumination of the soul, a sapiential capture, a disclosure of 
the hidden divine spark which lies inside all man, are operating. The wrench occurs 
towards the lower creaturality, towards the mere and flat humanity – i.e. towards 
the processuality of the ratio and the will to appropriation –; there is no usurpation 
or alteration towards the relation with God, towards the filiation, which is, on the 
contrary, strengthened and revived, confirmed and requited, not distorted and 
uprooted, and not even overcome. Man makes divine his own humanity without 
taking the place of God, and he doesn’t mingle with God, too. The subordination, 
the hierarchical nexus, which governs the relations between the cause and the 
caused being, stands for a supreme seal preventing every salvifical con-fusion and 
containing the temptation for an ecstatic mysticism. 
                                                          
3 Cf. Beierwaltes: Pensare l’Uno. Studi sulla filosofia neoplatonica e sulla storia dei suoi influssi, pp. 75-107 
(the chapter entitled “Realizzazione dell’immagine”). 
Man is placed by God in God: to accept this gift and to live authentically his 
situation inside God represents a human duty. By means of the inner deed4 – that is 
the Abgeschiedenheit and the Gelassenheit concerning above all the intellect (as Eckhart 
believed), but also the will (as in Cusanus and Bruno) – man places himself in an 
authentic way in God, he opens himself to the divinity, he discloses his divine side. 
Now only the intervention of God, the gratia gratum faciens, brings the human effort 
into accomplishment, lends efficiency to the opening and placing that man has 
undergone thanks to the inner deed. But, and this is the crucial point, the divine 
intervention is free, it is not caused by the inner human deed: it is a free gift given 
by God to all human beings, a gift to which man has free access by making it 
operate within himself and by accepting it in all its plenitude. In this sense, it is 
possible to say that the gratia gratum faciens brings the inner human deed into 
accomplishment, but this formulation is not to be thought of as a temporal 
sequence and as a causal connection; rather, it is to be thought of as a consequence 
of the problematic staying of man in the divine grace. In speculative mysticism, the 
god-man relation must be conceived as a strongly hierarchical relation,5 though 
man is endowed with a strong dynamism and is definitely marked by freedom. Man 
cannot give orders to God, and the human deed is never an action on God, but 
only an act in God; it is an inter-action within the grace (inwirken in der Gnade) and 
not a co-action with the grace (mitwirken mit der Gnade).6 Finally, in the sphere of which 
I’m speaking, it is possible to affirm that “grace is really all”,7 without the necessity of 
distinguishing sequences inside it, nor the duty to identify the moments of its 
course – instead carefully focusing on the human movements and agitations which 
are in its ‘bed’ –, without introducing salvifical events (corresponding to human 
deeds or representing an answer of God to the human call) in that ‘history’ of grace 
conceived as a disclosing of the relation between the divine and human freedom in 
the ‘mystical nexus’ object-subject.8 However it is right and proper to be fully aware 
of the opportuneness of all the space and temporal distinctions during the analysis. 
 
Such a conception, which places a man already penetrated by divine grace into 
an inexhaustible salvifical radiation, might lead to a rigid interpretation of the 
Cusanian system or be pushed toward a neoplatonic model. Nevertheless, I believe 
                                                          
4 I’m recalling here the known eckhartian terms because they allows to describe, in an incisive 
way, the process of elevation to the truth. In particular, in this notes, they are used regardings the 
nexus divine grace-inner deed. 
5 “What is created as image is similar to the archetype, but this one is not similar to its copy; the 
relation between archetype and copy is not mutual” (Beierwaltes: Platonismo nel Cristianesimo, p. 
172, transl. in English by me). 
6 Cf. Klein: Meister Eckhart. La dottrina mistica della giustificazione, p. 117-118. 
7 Ivi, p. 104, transl. in English by me. 
8 The creation and the Incarnation, in this area of interest, are considered, regarding man and the 
created beings, as already happened and always happening. 
that the personal characteristic of the prime Cause, i.e. the insistence on the divine 
freedom and will, the absolute gratuitousness of the gift of God and the presence 
of the Word made flesh as an intermediary figure, guarantees (even if this guaranty 
sometimes can appear problematically transitory, oscillating, in juridical terms, 
between the proper and the improper) the specificity of the cusanian thought. The 
comparison, emerging from the analysis of the possible presence of the theme of 
grace in Giordano Bruno’s thought, allows to test the differences between the 
neoplatonising Christianity of Cusanus and the germinated on a christian ground9 
Neoplatonism of Bruno. 
 
I think that this mechanism is verifiable in the thought of Cusanus. Here I will 
make reference above all to the Opuscula. 
According to Cusanus, human mind is created as viva imago Dei, and it is possible 
to say that man is placed in God by God, in fact God “is not far from anyone, 
since in Him we exist and live and are moved”10 (Quaer., 314) and “therefore, Theos 
– who is the Beginning from which things flow forth, the Middle in which we are 
moved, and the End unto which things flow back – is everything”11 (Quaer., 320). 
God can be considered as a place in which beings are placed: “without being in the 
wrong, God can be defined as the place, where ‘place’ is not meant according to 
the meaning of the word, but in a way surpassing all our feeble ideas”.12 The 
figuration of the position in the place allows to see the presence/absence of God in 
everything and to grasp the nexus of transcendence and immanence: all is in God, 
nothing can be out of the Cause, but there is a radical ontological difference 
between God and natural beings, which are in God. “Now, this must be considered 
in both its aspects; for then we will see clearly how it is that the Maximum is in 
each thing and in no thing. This symbolizes none other than the Maximum, since 
by similar reasoning the Maximum is [seen to be] in each thing, even as each thing 
[is seen to be] in it; moreover, [this symbolism] displays the reason that the 
Maximum exists in itself”13 (DI, 28); “And so, your intellect apprehends that the 
Maximum is neither identical with nor different from anything and that all things 
                                                          
9 As far as the relation of Bruno and Christianity, cf. the point of view of Guzzo: Giordano Bruno. 
10 “Non longe absit a quoquam, quoniam in ipso sumus, vivimus et movemur” (Quaer. I, 13). 
11 “Igitur omne theos, qui est principium effluxus, medium in quo movemur et finis refluxus” 
(Quaer. I, 22) 
12 “Deus non inconvenienter potest dici locus, non modo, quo intelligitur vis vocabuli, sed supra 
modum conceptus nostri infirmi” (Sermo CCXVI, Ubi est qui natus est Rex Iudaeorum? (1456), 84a, 
transl. in English by me). 
13 “Et hoc quidem coniunctim considerandum est; et clare videtur quomodo maximum est in 
qualibet re et in nulla. Et hoc non est aliud nisi maximum, cum sit eadem ratione in qualibet re, 
sicut quaelibet res in ipso, et sit metipsa ratio, quod tunc maximum sit in se ipso” (DI I, 66-68). 
are in it, from it, and through it”14 (DI, 36). The privileged position of man is due 
to the fact that, concerning the God-man relation, the human mind is viva imago Dei, 
expression which indicates a stronger proximity of man to God than the one 
designated by the concept of contractio (which concerns generally the natural beings). 
Faith is the fundamental premise of the mystical enterprise. A man who has not 
faith, doesn’t place himself in God in advance: he is in God (because he is created 
by God), but he doesn’t accept his condition as a created being subordinate to his 
Creator. “For nothing is attained without faith, which first sets the pilgrim on his 
journey. [...] Hence, if faith is present, ascent even unto being a son of God is not 
forbidden”15 (De fil., 342). Faith allows man to orientate himself, it places the 
traveller on the path and the hunter on the hunting ground. It is important to 
remember that faith is also a gift of God, because God qualifies man’s capacity in 
faith; it is a qualification in which man is placed (not thrown, but supported) and in 
which he choose the object to which he can apply his own freedom, the aim of his 
own choice. “There are also other lights which are infused by divine enlightening 
and which lead the intellectual power to perfection. For example, there is the light-
of-faith, through which the intellect is enlightened, so that it may ascend above 
reason unto an apprehension of Truth. And because [the intellect] is led by this 
light to believe that it can attain Truth (which, however, it cannot attain by the aid 
of reason, its “instrument,” so to speak), it rises – by means of a divinely given 
impulse – above the weakness and blindness which caused it to be dependent upon 
the aid of reason. And made strong by the word of faith, [the intellect] is led to be 
able to advance, without further aid of reason, in the certain hope of obtaining, on 
the basis of its steadfast faith, that which has been promised; and it quickly obtains 
it because of its loving pursuit”16 (De dato, 385). 
The inner deed is accompanied by the constant divine intervention, which is also 
part of grace and supports with firmness and inspires with strength the soul of the 
man in search of God. “It is now evident to us that we are drawn unto the 
unknown God by means of the motion of the light of the grace of Him who 
cannot be apprehended in any other way than by His revealing Himself. Moreover, 
                                                          
14 “Apprehendis itaque per intellectum quomodo maximum cum nullo est idem neque diversum, 
et quomodo omnia in ipso, ex ipso et per ipsum” (DI I, 86). 
15 “Nihil enim sine fide attingitur, quae primo in itinere viatorem collocat. [...] Non est igitur 
usque ad dei filiationem ascensus prohibitus, si fides adest” (De fil. I, 41). 
16 “Sunt et alia lumina, quae infunduntur per divinam illuminationem quae ducunt intellectualem 
potentiam ad perfectionem, sicut est lumen fidei, per quod illuminatur intellectus, ut super 
rationem ascendat ad apprehensionem veritatis. Et quia hoc lumine ducitur, ut credat se posse 
attingere veritatem, quam tamen adiutorio rationis, quae est quasi instrumentum eius, attingere 
nequit, et sic infirmitatem seu caecitatem, ob quam baculo rationis innitebatur, quodam conatu 
sibi divinitus indito linquit et per se incedere posse in verbo fidei fortificatus ducitur indubia spe 
assequendi promissum ex stabili fide, quod amoroso cursu festinanter apprehendit” (De dato V, 
85-86). 
He wills to be sought; He wills also to give, to those who are seeking, the light 
without which they cannot seek Him. He wills to be sought; He wills also to be 
apprehended, for He wills to disclose and manifest”17 (Quaer., 324). The divine 
grace is the wish of Himself that God puts inside man; God searches for Himself in 
man, or, to say it better, through man. In brief, it is possible to see at work a 
metaphysical scheme involving the Trinitarian conception of the divinity: the Cause 
turns towards Himself in Himself (the Trinitarian movement considered here in the 
divine punctuality) and out of Himself (the Trinitarian movement now examinated 
from the point of view of his development in the God-man relation). With the 
getting out from Himself, the exitus, is set also the return, the reditus. This double 
movements constitutes the breath of reality, and it gives birth to the ‘nostalgic con-
spiracy’ of all the beings, which, in conformity with their own nature, and therefore 
in accordance with their own limit, wish deeply to return to the origin, to fulfill a 
salvifical desire put and attested by Other. Man has a closer bond with the divinity: 
while all other natural beings manifest the desire of God in an harmonic way, but 
still heavily impaired by sensibility and materiality, he has the possibility to become 
an authentic son of God, to grasp the truth to the maximum degree of intensity, 
despite respecting human form and intellectual singularity. 
The divine grace completes the course of the mystical quest, coming as a 
superior accomplishment of the inner deed. “[...] they could attain unto wisdom 
and unto abiding intellectual life only if these were given by the gift of grace”18 
(Quaer., 325). Cusanus criticizes those who expect to reach the filiation by their 
strength alone, “as if a man, of himself and apart from the Father’s gift of grace 
and His drawing, could attain to apprehending wisdom”19 (De dato, 374). Moreover, 
and this is coherent with Eckhart and with the neoplatonic tradition, the moment 
of the conferral of the grace is described as a rapture, as a sudden wrench, the 
cause of which is an act of God: “as in the manner of a momentary rapture”20 
(ApDI, 467). The Abgeschiedenheit and the Gelassenheit, representing the inner deed, 
are nothing else than an unconditional opening to God, a surrender which is an 
authentic wait. Staying in this place, the detached man “rapi potest”.21 So grace 
intervenes to complete, to conclude the inner human deed: this kind of grace is 
named with the expression gratia gratum faciens (or second grace). In Cusanian 
                                                          
17 “Iam palam nobis est, quod ad ignotum deum attrahimur per motum luminis gratiae eius, qui 
aliter deprehendi nequit, nisi se ipsum ostendat. Et quaeri vult. Vult et quaerentibus lumen dare, 
sine quo ipsum quaerere nequeunt. Vult quaeri, vult et apprehendi, quia vult quaerentibus aperire 
et se ipsum manifestare” (Quaer. III, 27-28). 
18 “[...] non posse attingere sapientiam et vitam intellectualem perennem, nisi daretur dono 
gratiae” (Quaer. III, 28). 
19 “Quasi aliquis homo ex se possit etiam pervenire ad apprehensionem sapientiae sine dono 
gratiae seu attractione patris” (De dato I, 70). 
20 “Quasi via momentanei raptus” (ApDI, 12). 
21 ApDI, 20. 
thought, in my opinion, grace is not explainable simplistically by appelling to a 
deterministic mechanism, it is not a divine act answering to a merely human 
demand or to a cry of the human being. And it is not a simple formal ratification by 
a divinity, which certificates a human progress in the terms of knowledge. Surely 
grace answers to a human question, but because that question is already placed 
inside grace, and precisely the position of man (his situation) into grace, and the 
preliminary acceptance of this ontological condition by man through faith, change 
the doubt of an individual – untied and unbond from the truth – into the 
question22 of a person who is already an interpretation and a prospect of the truth.23 
And grace is not a weak external imputation, but it is the internal living 
confirmation, which confirms the real presence of the divinity inside man: it is the 
act of a transcendent God, who attests from the outside his residing inside a human 
soul, which freely has chosen to answer to the call of faith and to make operative 
the desire of God (here the genitive form is to be understood both in a subjective 
and objective way) which is congenital to man by means of the inner deed. 
From this speech comes to light a mechanism of grace which can be well 
represented by the metaphysical scheme of the radiation, typical of the neoplatonic 
thought. On this subject it is helpful to quote the use that Cusanus makes, in the De 
filiatione Dei, of the sensible enigma of the mirror. In the domain of the catoptrical 
game built up by Cusanus the point of radition is the mirror of the divine Word, 
perfect and infinite mirror which represents “a most lofty Reflection of our 
Beginning, viz., the glorious God”24 (De fil., 347) and which means the Father’s 
manifesting power, the truth’s diffusive capacity. The contracted mirrors, 
ontologically imperfect compared to the supreme mirror, are inside the radiant 
domain of truth and reflect, in a distorted way, the full divine light. Only through 
the inner deed man can have access to the divine filiation: “And so, Brother, 
[mentally] remove the quantitative contractions of the sensible mirrors, and free 
your conception from place and time and all things sensible, elevating yourself unto 
the rational reflected-brightnesses, where in clear reason our mind beholds truth”25 
(De fil., 348). The sensible mirror, remaining a mirror – and so preserving its own 
intellectual singularity and its own human condition –, can purify itself and reach 
the transfiguring vision of truth. By accepting the superabundant and divine life, 
the perfect human mirror – finited but terse, limited but rectified – is capable to see 
                                                          
22 Concerning the difference between question and doubt and their respective relations with faith 
cf. Pareyson: Ontologia della libertà. Il male e la sofferenza, pp. 343-344. 
23 Cf. Cuozzo: Mystice videre. Esperienza religiosa e pensiero speculativo in Cusano, pp. 167-177 (the 
paragraph entitled “Prospettivismo ed espressività del visus umano”). 
24 “Altissima resplendentia principii nostri dei gloriosi” (De fil. III, 48). 
25 “Tolle itaque, frater, contractiones quantificativas sensibilium speculorum et a loco et tempore 
et cunctis sensibilibus conceptum absolvas elevando te ipsum ad rationales speculares claritates, 
ubi in ratione clara mens nostra veritatem speculatur” (De fil. III, 50). 
the truth of the divine Word and, at the same time, the truth of all the other 
mirrors and its own truth: it perfectly reflects in itself the whole radiant light, even 
if in its own way, it places itself authentically in the origin without becoming a new 
origin. 
I believe that the scheme of the radiation can be used also to explain the 
doctrine of grace, if grace is thought as a dynamising of the concept of God, and 
the salvifical gift as flowing from the supreme cause by divine will. So the 
contraction of God are placed inside the domain of grace, inside the radiant power 
of the truth. Man is soaked in the divine grace even when he looks away from his 
own origin, even when he consigns himself to sin, because “where sin increased, 
grace abounded all the more” (Rm 5,20). Man is already inside grace, not only 
because he was created by God, but also because God, in his highest goodness, has 
already given to him the gratia gratum faciens, i.e. God has already placed man in 
grace, he has already given him the justification: it is a human duty to accept the 
justification of God by making it operating, by turning it into an actual and 
effective presence. But, has it a real sense to make distinctions inside grace when 
facing questions linked to the speculative mysticism of authors like Eckhart and 
Cusanus? Therefore man is always in the grace of God, but, if he doesn’t rectify his 
soul, if he doesn’t realize the inner deed, he cannot have full access to the divine 
grace. If he doesn’t look at the divine Word, at the pole of the inexhaustible truth, 
if he doesn’t place himself authentically in it by means of faith and inner deed, he 
doesn’t receive the gift of the eternal birth, the divine filiation. It is necessary to 
underline that the grace is a free gift of God, that in God, above all, will and 
freedom give birth to the mechanism of salvation and justification, that we are in 
front of a system in which a personal god turns to a human person, by the only 
means of his incarnation. It is important to avoid placing Cusanus in a tout court 
neoplatonic thought and, as we will see, to avoid bringing together a concept of 
grace as inexhaustible springing horizon and a metaphysical constitution, such as 
the one of an author who was influenced and fascinated by Cusanus (I’m referring 
to Giordano Bruno, in the probably more neoplatonic declension of his thought - 
that is the Eroici furori). 
The Christology of Cusanus is indissolubly linked to the theme of grace 
developed in a mystical way. The filiation of Christ is the model of the filiation of 
man. Not only because it is an example to follow, a perfection to which man must 
try to conform, but above all because the incarnation of the Verbum is the origin of 
the human filiation, and without the mediation of Christ man wouldn’t be able to 
cross the wall which separates him from the full presence of God in his soul. It is 
possible to say that gratia incarnationis est pro gratia inhabitationis. Cusanus says: “but 
since the sonship of the Only Begotten [Son] is without mode, in an identity of 
nature with the Father, it is Super-absolute Sonship, in which and through which all 
sons by adoption obtain their sonship”26 (De fil., 342-343). In the De visione Dei it is 
possible to find these significant passages, thank to which we can comprehend that 
divine filiation and human filiation live together in Christ, and that Christ is the 
origin, the means and the end of the human filiation: “therefore, man can be united 
to You through Your Son, who is the uniting Medium. [...] Therefore, in You, 
Jesus, the human sonship (for You are son of man) is most closely united to the 
Divine Sonship. Hence, You are rightly called Son of God and of man, since in You 
nothing mediates between son of man and Son of God. In Absolute Sonship, 
which the Son of God is, all sonship is enfolded; and to Absolute Sonship Your 
human sonship, O Jesus, is supremely united. Therefore, Your human sonship 
exists in the Divine Sonship not only in an enfolded manner but also as the 
attracted in the attracting, the united in the uniting, and the substantified in the 
substantifying”27 (De vis., 720-721). And these passages of the De docta ignorantia 
bring to light that only Christ could, by nature, ascend ad aeterna et caelestia and that 
man instead can obtain, through grace, ex Christo, the justification, answering 
through the inner deed to the divine gift: “except for Christ Jesus, who descended 
from Heaven, there was never anyone who had [enough] power over himself and 
over his own nature (which in its origin is so subject to the sins of carnal desire) to 
be able, of himself, to ascend beyond his own origin to eternal and heavenly things. 
Jesus is the one who ascended by His own power and in whom the human nature 
(begotten not from the will of the flesh but from God) was not hindered from 
mightily returning to God the Father. [...] Therefore, our justification is not from 
ourselves but from Christ. Since He is complete fullness, in Him we obtain all 
things, if we possess Him”28 (DI, 128-129). So the divine filiation of Christ is a 
model for the human filiation, a model which is not far away and inactive, but 
which is present and operating inside man. Also here the logic of presence/absence 
is active: in a completed imitatio Christi, man reachs his perfection only thanks to a 
gift of God and not by his own nature, i.e. not by something which is connatural to 
him, but thanks to something which, even if it is all along in him present and 
                                                          
26 “Sed ipsa unigeniti filiatio sine modo in identitate naturae patris exsistens est ipsa superabsoluta 
filiatio, in qua et per quam omnes adoptionis filii filiationem adipiscentur” (De fil. I, 42). 
27 “Potest igitur homo tibi uniri per filium tuum, qui est medium unionis. [...] Filiatio igitur 
humana, quia tu filius homini, filiationi divinae in te, Ihesu, altissime unita est, ut merito dicaris 
filius Dei et hominis, quoniam in te nihil mediat inter filium hominis et filium Dei. In filiatione 
absoluta, quae est filius Dei, omnis complicatur filiatio, cui filiatio humana tua, Ihesu, est supreme 
unita. Subsistit igitur humana filiatio tua in divina non solum complicite, sed ut attractum in 
attraente et unitum in uniente et substantiatum in substantiante” (De vis. XIX, 67-68). 
28 “Nemo umquam fuit ex se potens supra se ipsum ac propriam suam naturam ita peccatis 
desiderii carnalis originaliter subditam posse ascendere supra suam radicem ad aeterna et caelestia, 
nisi qui de caelo descendit Christus Iesus. Hic est, qui et propria virtute ascendit, in quo ipsa 
humana natura non ex voluntate carnis, sed ex deo nata nihil obstaculi habuit, quin et potenter ad 
deum patrem rediret. [...] Non est igitur iustificatio nostra ex nobis, sed ex Christo. Qui cum sit 
omnis plenitudo, in ipso omnia consequimur, si ipsum habuerimus” (DI III, 42-46). 
operating (man is all along in Christ), comes to man, with the maximum of 
intensity, only from the outside as a free act of God. The intermediary function of 
Christ, which shapes him, in a metaphysical pregnant sense, as a transcendent and 
immanent model for man, includes also the role of guarantor of the extension of 
the divine light to the human form, and in particular of an elevation which permits 
the preservation of the intellectual singularity inside a transfiguration of the human 
nature. “So the man, who adheres to Christ, adheres to his own humanity, 
therefore he becomes as one with Christ, as Christ is one with God. For this 
reason, anyone, who adheres to Christ and is united to him, obtains the remission 
of his sins, the justification and the inner rebirth, certainly not in any other being, 
but in his own humanity, which is also the humanity of Christ, because exactly his 
humanity, which is the same in him and in Christ, is united to the divine Word. Oh, 
very great mistery! Here you can see how the humane nature in Christ is fulfilled 
with immortality”.29 Finally Christ is the model and the cause of the integrative 
union of the human and the divine in man: union which is completely fulfilled in 
that man capable of bringing to completion the filiation, union which provides for 
a correction of the human inner being and for its extrication from the mortal fog of 
the mere creaturality, union which places man in Christ and which makes Christ 
really operating inside the human soul. “If, amongst the divine persons, the Son 
assumed the humanity, it is clear that you, as man, can be elevated to the divine 
filiation through Christ, who lives in you”.30 Also in the cristology of Cusanus, a 
coexistence of human freedom and divine grace happens: the free gift of God is 
the place where man can employ his own freedom, where the human will must 
conform itself to divine will. 
The strengthening of the presence of the will in God – a presence marked by 
Cusanus from the De beryllo31 –, affects obviously also the doctrine of the second 
grace, contributing to emphasize the freedom of the divine gift. “The creature is 
the intention of the Creator. And let us consider this intention to be the creature’s 
truest quiddity. [...] Now, to simplify a [perceptual] form is to remove its 
corruptible accidents – which cannot be the quiddity – in order to arrive at the 
intention of the Creator-Intellect by making inferences on the basis of more subtle 
images, just as we would on the basis of oral words or of written characters. We 
                                                          
29 “Homo igitur, qui Christo adhaeret, ille suae propriae humanitati adhaeret, ut sit unus cum 
Christo, sicut Christus cum Deo. Propter hoc quisque Christo adhaerens et unitus non in alio, sed 
in sua humanitate, quae est et Christi, satisfecit debito, iustificatur, vivificatur, quia ipsa sua 
humanitas, quae est una in eo et Christo, Deo Verbo unita est. O maximum mysterium! Hic 
vides, quo modo natura humana in Christo ‘induit immortalitatem’ per unionem ad Verbum” 
(Sermo XXII, Dies santificatus (1440), 354b-355a, transl. in English by me). 
30 “Si Filius in divinis assumpsit humanitatem, manifestum est te hominem ad filiationem divinam 
per inhabitantem in te Christum effici posse” (Sermo XXII, Dies santificatus (1440), 356b, transl. in 
English by me). 
31 Cf. Santinello: Introduzione a Niccolò Cusano, p. 96. 
know that the object’s quiddity – which is contained in those signs of, and forms 
of, the perceptible object (contained as in letters or oral words) – is the Intellect’s 
intention. Thus, the perceptible object is as the Creator’s word, in which His 
intention is contained; when we apprehend this intention, we know the quiddity, 
and we are satisfied. Now, the manifestation occurs for the sake of the intention; 
for the Speaker, or Creator-Intellect, intends to manifest Himself in that way. 
Therefore, when we apprehend the intention, which is the quiddity of the word, we 
know the essential being”32 (Beryl., 817). From the point of view of will (it is not the 
only one, but it is the point of view that Cusanus now try to underline), God is a 
creative intention in the relation which connects him to the natural beings, in the 
same way man, here true omologous of God, is a creative intention in the relation 
which ties him to his own rational beings, the conjectures. Considering the 
indissoluble nexus (imago Dei) which binds man to God, man achieves the 
fulfillment of the filiation by knowing himself as intention, as creative will, because 
“it is evident that God is incomprehensible by every creature, since He is 
immeasurable by every mind; for He is greater than every [mind’s] capacity, or 
capability. But if God is to be attained, then He is attained not as He is attainable in 
Himself but [only] as He is attainable by the attaining [mind]. And this [attainment] 
occurs in equality-of-measure with the [mind] that attains Him. Thus, all minds 
attain God in conformity to their capability”33 (Compl., 765). The efficaciously 
placing in God (the Creator) of man (the creature) by faith and the self-knowing of 
man as will surely raise issues concerning the relations between intellect and will in 
God and in man, but here is important to express that, if in God the role of the will 
is underlined, the will will be emphasize not only concerning the act of divine 
creation (the first grace), but also concerning the justifying moment of the second 
grace. And grace is above all a gift, the will of God, the free nature of which is here 
reaffirmed. 
 
                                                          
32 “Creatura est intentio conditoris; et consideremus intentionem esse verissimam quidditatem 
eius. [...] Simplificare autem species est abicere accidentia corruptibilia, quae non possunt esse 
quidditas, ut in subtilioribus phantasmatibus discurrendo, quasi in sermone seu scriptura ad 
intentionem conditoris intellectus perveniamus scientes, quod quidditas rei illius, quae in illis 
signis et figuris rei sensibilis sicut in scriptura aut sermone vocali continetur, est intentio 
intellectus, ut sensibile sit quasi verbum conditoris, in quo continetur ipsius intentio, qua 
apprehensa scimus quidditatem et quiescimus. Est autem intentionis causa manifestatio, intendit 
enim se sic manifestare ipse loquens seu conditor intellectus. Apprehensa igitur intentione, quae 
est quidditas verbi, habemus “quod erat esse”” (Beryl. XXXI, 40). 
33 “Est igitur ex hoc manifestum deum incomprehensibilem per omnem creaturam, quia omni 
mente immensurabilis; maior enim est omni capacitate. Sed si deus attingi debet, tunc attingitur 
non, ut est attingibilis in se, sed ut est attingibilis in attingente, et hoc est in aequalitate mensurae 
attingentis ipsum. Sic omnes mentes attingunt deum secundum mensuram suae capacitatis” 
(Compl. XI, 56). 
In the metaphysical thought of Giordano Bruno, such as in the De la causa, 
principio et uno, every single concrete form is merely an accidental concretion of the 
vita-materia infinita and it is submitted to the incessant cycle of the vicissitude: “every 
concrete determination and all the particular forms are therefore accidental 
dispositions”,34 so it is possible to affirm that “the classical distinction between 
universal and singular turns into the one between substantial and accidental”.35 
Nevertheless, observing the mysticism of Giordano Bruno, man seems to find a 
typical ‘substantiality’, a typical autonomy, even if situated inside a metaphysical 
context, unavoidable for the comprehension of nature and of the role of man. It is 
a “conception which [...] returns to the essential reasons of the ficinian and 
especially pichian humanism [...]. And it is for this reason that the Eroici furori can 
be considered as the only work of Bruno dominated by humanistic worries”.36 
As supra affirmed, an analysis of the possible presence of the theme of grace in 
the Nolan’s works allows to explore the differences which exist between the 
neoplatonising Christianity of Cusanus and a system which can be said, lato sensu, 
neoplatonic.37 
Bruno, in the Eroici furori, affirms that the furious, in the highest moment of his 
mystical course, can only reach the infinity of nature, and not the one of the prime 
Cause. In fact, in this work, Bruno theorizes the existence of a “monade prima” 
(prime monad, the Apollo), whose attainment remains precluded to man, and the 
existence of a “monade seconda” (second monad, the Diana), that man can attain 
by means of an inner deed, which involves the intellect (the “lume della ragione”) 
and the will (the “meridiano del core”). 
The second monad corresponds to the infinity of nature, but not to the infinity 
of the explicated nature. The second monad is the infinite and divine origin of the 
explication, not the result of the explication of that origin. This result is also infinite 
and divine, but ‘only’ as a reflection. This distinction can be understood by keeping 
in mind that the explicated nature is the place of the discursive reason, which is a 
faculty capable of passing from one form to another, following the vicissitudinal 
stream, but which is also incapable of comprehending (cum-prehendere) the privative 
infinity of the explicated nature. Only the “lume della ragione”, that is the most 
elevated part of the rational sphere, can culminate in the second monad and can 
                                                          
34
 Spruit: Il problema della conoscenza in Giordano Bruno, p. 187, transl. in English by me. 
35 Ivi, p. 187 n. 96, transl. in English by me. Cf. also Mignini: “La dottrina dell’individuo in 
Cusano e in Bruno”. 
36 Corsano: Il pensiero di Giordano Bruno nel suo svolgimento storico, p. 172, transl. in English by me. 
37 Here I’m referring above all to the dialogues De gli eroici furori. The dialogues De gli eroici furori 
are quoted from: Giordano Bruno, Dialoghi filosofici italiani, Milano, Mondadori, 2000, 20055, a 
cura e con un saggio introduttivo di M. Ciliberto, note ai testi a cura di N. Tirinnanzi, bibliografia 
a cura di M. E. Severini, indice analitico a cura di F. Dell’Omodarme. The English translation of 
the quotations is mine. 
give to man the divine condition, that state of being which, in the magical 
declension of the brunian thought, provides the control of the vicissitude, for the 
providence. 
But what kind of relation exists between the first and the second monad? The 
Diana (the second monad) is defined as an “order of second intellects bringing the 
received glory from the first one”.38 Bruno says that the second monad in front of 
the first one is “its created being, which is similar to it, which is its image: because 
from the monad, which is the divinity, proceeds this monad which is the nature, 
the universe, the world”.39 So the second monad (nature in its originating 
inexhaustibility) proceeds from the first monad (which is also called prime 
intellect), and the second monad is the image of the first one. Bruno seems to 
adopt a neoplatonic language to transmit a new figuration of his metaphysics. Now, 
I cannot face the delicate question of the relation between trascendence and 
immanence in the works of Giordano Bruno, a question which, in my opinion, 
should be faced by comparing the De la causa with the Lampas triginta statuarum. But 
it can be assumed that the second monad could correspond to the infinite matter of 
the De la causa and the first monad could represent an intellectual cause that is 
external to the matter, and which gives it a form. The derivation of the second 
monad from the first and the derivation of the explicated nature from the second 
monad present the features of the necessary process – it is a necessity which 
coexists indeed with freedom, a free necessity or, to say it better, a necessity which 
finds at its own summit, inside its own origin, the coincidence of necessity and 
freedom typical of the neoplatonic system40 – and the causes involved can be 
characterized in an impersonal way. But in order to affirm something with more 
confidence, it would be more than appropriate to study in what measure Bruno 
uses neoplatonism to deform a structure which is referable to the neoplatonic 
Christianity.  
As far as the attainment of the highest moment, the moment in which the heroic 
furious brings into accomplishment his own humanity by reaching the second 
monad (Bruno seems to preserve the transcendence of the first Cause in the final 
stage of the course of knowledge), the Nolan describes a mechanism similar to the 
one characterizing Eckhart’s and Cusanus’ thought. Man, already placed in a divine 
horizon as a place which is immanent to him but, at least in the Eroici furori, which 
is always transcendent to him, places himself at the divinity’s reception by means of 
the inner deed of the Abgeschiedenheit; this human deed is necessary, but not 
                                                          
38 “Ordine di seconde intelligenze che riportano il splendor ricevuto dalla prima” (Furori, II, 1, p. 
899). 
39 “Sua genitura che gli è simile, che è la sua imagine: perché dalla monade che è la divinitade, 
procede questa monade che è la natura, l’universo, il mondo” (Furori, II, 2, 921). 
40 Cf. Leroux : “Introduction”. 
sufficient. “[...] since to see the divinity is to be seen by it, as to see the sun 
contribute to be seen by it. In the same way to be listened by the divinity is to listen 
to it, and to be preferred by it is to be disposed to it [...] but the divine power, 
which is all in all, does not offer itself nor escape, if not by others’ conversion or 
aversion”41 and “because from this it will doubtness happen that the divinity has an 
influence upon him; this divinity is all over present and ready to be ingested by 
whom is able to turn himself to it with an act of the intellect and to expose himself 
to it with an affection of the will”.42 In another passage of the same work, the 
hunter of the truth, Atteone, becomes the prey of truth itself – he is pulled to 
pieces by his own dogs –; he reachs the veritatis apprehensio, by opening himself, by 
abandoning himself to the truth, by being overcome by it. In brief, it is possible to 
say that, mutatis mutandis, in Bruno’s thought, a metaphysical scheme of the mystical 
experience is present, which is similar to the one described for Cusanus: man is 
placed in divinity, and in man the divine trace lies hidden in the “lume razionale” 
and in the “meridiano del core”; by means of the inner deed, the furious places 
himself to be hunted and enraptured, he discloses his divine side, setting it free 
from the thick blanket of creaturality; man’s effort isn’t sufficient and the divinity 
completes, brings into accomplishment the process of deification. 
 
However, in Nolan’s thought, as I said before, the neplatonising structure 
induces a disfigurement of the personal features of the divinity – together with a 
radical rejection of the Incarnation and with a reformulation of the concept of 
faith. Moreover, the divine man has no relation with a personal prime cause, but he 
can access only to the second monad, which is conceived by the author as an 
intermediate neoplatonic hypostasis placed between the first monad and the 
explicated nature. Therefore, in the case of Bruno, I don’t believe it is correct to 
speak in terms of grace, of a free gift that a personal god, in his full freedom, gives 
and entrusts to man.43 In my opinion, in order to describe the nolan declension of 
the divine intervention in the deification mechanism, it is more opportune to use 
the expression ‘cooperation of the Cause’,44 where with ‘cooperation’ it is meant 
                                                          
41 “[...] atteso che veder la divinità è l’esser visto da quella, come vedere il sole concorre con 
l’esser visto dal sole; parimente essere ascoltato dalla divinità è a punto ascoltar quella, et esser 
favorito da quella è il medesimo esporsegli [...] ma la divina potenza che è tutta in tutto, non si 
porge o suttrae se non per altrui conversione o aversione” (Furori, II, 1, p. 893-894). 
42 “Perché da qua avverrà che senza dubio gl’influisca la divinità la qual da per tutto è presente e 
pronta ad ingerirsi a chi se gli volta con l’atto de l’intelletto, et aperto se gli espone con l’affetto 
de la voluntade” (Furori, I, 5, p. 849). 
43 Cf. Ingegno: “L’unità dell’opera bruniana e il significato degli “Eroici furori””, pp. 238-239. 
44 Cf., for the corresponding mechanism in a neoplatonic environment, for example, Beierwaltes: 
Proclo. I fondamenti della sua metafisica, pp. 316, 318, 323, 326, 347, 353, 401; Beierwaltes: Pensare 
l’Uno. Studi sulla filosofia neoplatonica e sulla storia dei suoi influssi, pp. 104, 107, 124, 131; Fattal: Plotino, 
gli Gnostici e Agostino, pp. 60, 66. 
not a free action of a superior being, but rather a necessary mechanism in a 
metaphysical structure. To the cooperation of the Cause corresponds the human 
operation in the Cause: this one attests the importance of human freedom, its 
derivation from the original model and its staying inside the divine horizon; the 
human operation in the Cause is in the cooperation of the Cause, the cooperation 
of the Cause surpasses the human operation in the Cause. The cooperation does 
not provide for an inclination, a communication, an attention of the cause towards 
the caused, but it is an impersonal and necessary ‘action’, that the Cause executes 
into a being which is placed in the Cause and which has placed itself in an authentic 
way in the Cause, because it has disposed itself to the reception of the Cause (even 
if it is already pre-disposed). The staying of man in the Cause provides for the 
constant, impersonal and necessary intervention of a divinity which inspires and 
initiates, supports and carries, and, and it is the most important thing here, 
concludes and perfects the rising movement carried out by the differentiated man 
in full freedom. I would like to remember that, when one affirms that the 
cooperation of the Cause is characterized by necessity, it is opportune not to forget 
that a close relation between necessity and freedom exists in the Origin and that 
Bruno is aware of it: for example in the Summa terminorum metaphysicorum he writes 
that “its will is its own very necessity and necessity is the very divine will, in which 
necessity does not compromise freedom, because necessity and freedom are as one. 
[...] So in God freedom makes necessity and necessity attests freedom. Freedom, 
will and necessity are rather as one”.45 These words establish a certain relation 
between freedom and necessity inside their own concidence, but don’t remove the 
necessary nature (‘free necessity’ only because it finds at its own source a 
coexistence of freedom and necessity) of what I have called ‘cooperation of the 
Cause’. 
All is in the divine cause, because all comes out of it. Man, to have access to the 
maximum grade of knowledge or, to say it in a better way, to gain the vision of the 
divinity, must make operative in himself the presence of the Cause, which placed 
him and which costantly supports him. Also, in Bruno, man cannot give orders to 
the divinity, man cannot constrain the divinity to show itself to him and to divinize 
him, but only the divinity can give itself to him, can conquer him all the way to the 
truth. The abandonment of the creatural features is an opening to the divinity, it is 
a disposition which is a discovery and an attestation of the pre-disposition of the 
                                                          
45 “Eius voluntas est ipsa necessitas et necessitas est ipsa divina voluntas, in qua necessitate non 
praeiudicatur libertati, quandoquidem necessitas et libertas unum sunt. [...] Ibi ergo libertas facit 
necessitatem et necessitas contestatur libertatem. [...] quin potius ipsa libertas, voluntas, necessitas 
sunt unum et idem” (Summa terminorum metaphysicorum, in Iordani Bruni Nolani Opera Latine 
conscripta, publicis sumptibus edita, recensebat F. Fiorentino [F. Tocco, H. Vitelli, V. Imbriani, C. 
M. Tallarigo], Neapoli-Florentiae, D. Morano-Le Monnier, 1879-1891 (riprod. anast. Stuttgart-
Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, 1962), vol. I, pars 4, p. 95, transl. in English by me). 
man in the Cause, it is an abandonment to the impersonal, necessary and 
everlasting mechanisms which articulate the configurations of the being and which 
constitute its reality. The heroic furious, interacting in that mechanism, and so 
accepting the ‘cooperation of the Cause’, transforms the occult presence of the 
divine in his soul in a dazzling presentia realis. 
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